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Freeman and Haynie: Creditors' Rights

CREDITORS' RIGHTS
COURT EXAMINES THE APPLICATION OF THE
NECESSARIES DOCTRINE AND THE PRECONDITIONS OF A
PERSON'S LIABILITY FOR THE DEBTS OF A SPOUSE

In 1984 the South Carolina Supreme Court, in Richland Memorial
Hospital v. Burton,' extended the common-law necessaries doctrine in a
gender-neutral fashion; the court expressly held "that the necessaries doctrine
allows third parties providing necessaries to a husband or wife to bring an
action against the individual's spouse." 2 More recently, in Trident Regional
Medical Center v. Evans,3 the South Carolina Court of Appeals specified the
particular steps a creditor must take to establish a debt and recover from the
non-debtor spouse under the necessaries doctrine. 4 Essentially, the Evans
court held that both spouses are jointly and severally liable for necessaries
obtained by their debtor mates. 5 Evans extends the common-law necessaries
doctrine and creates a reciprocal support duty for both spouses. Creditors who
find that the debtor spouse is unwilling or unable to pay for necessary goods
or services now have a broad collection remedy-the non-debtor spouse's
separate property and jointly owned property are subject to execution and
levy.6 In order to reach its conclusion, the Evans court was forced to
maneuver around a prior appellate decision, Anderson Memorial Hospital, Inc.
v. Hagen.7 Hagen rather explicitly imposes upon a creditor an obligation to
seek recovery from the principal-debtor spouse as a precondition to liability
against the non-debtor spouse. 8 What the Evans decision does is explain what
Hagen intended by requiring a creditor to "first seek to recover from the assets
of the

. . .

primary obligor."'

What is procedurally necessary?

At English common-law, the husband solely was liable for the expenses
of necessary food, clothing, shelter, and medical services provided to his wife
during cohabitation.10 This, the necessaries doctrine, served to provide for

1. 282 S.C. 159, 318 S.E.2d 12 (1984).
2. Id. at 161, 318 S.E.2d at 13.
3. 317 S.C. 346, 454 S.E.2d 343 (Ct. App. 1995).
4. Id. at 350, 454 S.E.2d at 345. For the actual steps see supra note 28 and accompanying
text.
5. See id. at 350, 454 S.E.2d at 345-46.
6. See id.
7. 313 S.C. 497, 443 S.E.2d 399 (Ct. App. 1994), cited with approvalin Amisub of South
Carolina, Inc. v. Passmore., 316 S.C. 112, 447 S.E.2d 207 (1994).
8. Id. at 499, 443 S.E.2d at 401.
9. Id.
10. HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAWv OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 250
(2d ed. 1988).
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wives whose husbands failed to support them and their children" and "was
founded on the husband's duty of support and his ability to use his wife's
property to satisfy h[is] debts."' 2 The need for such protection arose from the
doctrine of coverture. Upon marriage, husband and wife were deemed to
merge into one person so that the woman had no separate legal identity. As
society and the law viewed the husband as the family provider, he retained the
capacity to own and manage the marital property and to contract for goods and
services. 3
Until recently, American courts had retained the common-law doctrine of
necessaries in a form virtually unchanged from its English ancestor. The status
of women in modem American society, the protections provided by state equal
rights amendments, and mid-level scrutiny of gender-based classifications
under tie Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 4 have
prompted many states either
to modify the doctrine in a gender-neutral
16
fashion 5 or to abandon it.

11. See North Carolina Baptist Hosps., Inc. v. Harris, 354 S.E.2d 471, 472 (N.C. 1987).
12. Richland Mem'l Hosp. v. Burton, 282 S.C. 159, 160, 318 S.E.2d 12, 13 (1984).
13. See John D. Johnston, Jr., Sex and Property:The Common Law Tradition, The Law
School Curriculum, and Developments Toward Equality, 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1033, 1045-46
(1972). Implicit in the wife's incapacity to contract and own property was that all of her
previously owned and subsequently acquired property became marital property under the
dominion of the husband.
14. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (providing that "[n]o State shall make or enforce any
law which shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws").
15. See St. Francis Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Bowles, 836 P.2d 1123 (Kan. 1992); Jersey
Shore Med. Ctr.-Fitkin Hosp. v. Estate of Baum, 417 A.2d 1003 (N.J. 1980); Medical Bus.
Assocs., Inc. v. Steiner, 588 N.Y.S.2d 890 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992); Harris, 354 S.E.2d 471;
Burton, 282 S.C. 159, 318 S.E.2d 12.
16. See Emanuel v. McGriff, 596 So. 2d 578 (Ala. 1992); Condore v. Prince George's
County, 425 A.2d 1011 (Md. 1981); Schilling v. Bedford County Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 303 S.E.2d
905 (Va. 1983). Both the Hagen approach, which places primary liability on the debtor, and the
Evans joint-and-several-liability approach have been adopted in a number of jurisdictions, but
other jurisdictions have deferred modification to their respective legislatures leaving the original
common-law doctrine intact. See Davis v. Baxter County Reg'l Hosp., 855 S.W.2d 303 (Ark.
1993); Shands Teaching Hosp. & Clinics, Inc. v. Smith, 497 So. 2d 644 (Fla. 1986); Hitchcock
Clinic, Inc. v. Mackie, 648 A.2d 817 (Vt. 1993). Another approach, which recognizes that many
women have not yet reached complete equality in the home or the workplace, places primary
liability on the husband and secondary liability on the wife after the husband's assets are
exhausted. See In re Estate of Stromsted, 299 N.W.2d 226 (Vis. 1980). This variation may not
comport with intermediate level scrutiny of gender-based classifications under the Equal
Protection Clause, but the Wisconsin Supreme Court has held that such a gender-based approach
is constitutional because women are not similarly situated to men in their ability to contribute to
the family's income despite having made advances in the job market. Marshfield Clinic v.
Discher, 314 N.W.2d 326, 329, 331 (Wis. 1982). Still other jurisdictions have abrogated the
doctrine altogether and left any chance for its return to the whim of the state legislature. See
Emanuel v. McGriff, 596 So. 2d 578 (Ala. 1992); Condore v. Prince George's County, 425 A.2d
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The status of married women began to improve in South Carolina with the
enactment of the South Carolina Constitution of 1868, which gave married
women the right to own and convey property separate from their husbands'
property. 7 Reinforcing this right, the Married Women's Property Acts were
passed in the late 1870's.18 Finally, the South Carolina Constitution of 1895
expressly granted married women the capacity to contract.1 9 Increased
property and contractual rights, along with women's increasing prominence in
all spheres of society during this century, have caused courts to reconsider the
purpose of the necessaries doctrine in modem society.
Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has settled on an intermediate
level of scrutiny in review so that "classifications by gender must serve
important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to
achievement of those objectives. "20
In Richland Memorial Hospital v. Burton2 the South Carolina Supreme
Court followed a host of other state courts' and found that South Carolina's
codification of the necessaries doctrine in section 20-5-60 "denie[s] husbands
equal protection of the laws by failing to impose a reciprocal obligation on
wives."' Thus, the statute could not pass the intermediate level of scrutiny
prescribed by the Supreme Court. Faced with similar constitutional arguments
some courts have abandoned the necessaries doctrine.24 The Burton court,
however, construed statutory amendments' (that provided for alimony and
the support of children in a gender-neutral fashion) as evidencing legislative

1011 (Md. 1981); Schilling v. Bedford County Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 303 S.E.2d 905 (Va. 1983).
17. See S.C. CONST. art. XIV, § 8 (1868).
18. See Trident Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Evans, 317 S.C. 346, 348, 454 S.E.2d 343, 344 (Ct.
App. 1995).
19. S.C. CONST. art. XVII, § 9 (1895) (stating:
The real and personal property of a woman held at the time of her marriage, or that
which she may thereafter acquire, either by gift, grant, inheritance, devise or
otherwise, shall be her separate property, and she shall have all the rights incident to
the same to which an unmarried woman or a man is entitled. She shall have the
power to contract and be contracted with in the same manner as if she were
unmarried.).
20. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
21. 282 S.C. 159, 318 S.E.2d 12 (1984).
22. Id. at 160-61, 318 S.E.2d at 13; see Manatee Convalescent Ctr., Inc. v. McDonald, 392
So. 2d 1356 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Condore v. Prince George's County, 425 A.2d 1011
(Md. 1981); Jersey Shore Med. Ctr.-Fitkin Hosp. v. Estate of Baum, 417 A.2d 1003 (N.J.
1980); Schilling v. Bedford County Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 303 S.E.2d 905 (Va. 1983).
23. Burton, 282 S.C. at 160-61, 318 S.E.2d at 13.
24. Courts in Alabama, Maryland, and Virginia abandoned the doctrine and deferred any
re-enactment of it to their respective legislatures. See Emanuel v. McGriff, 596 So. 2d 578 (Ala.
1992); Condore, 425 A.2d 1011; Schilling, 303 S.E.2d 905.
25. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-120 (Law. Co-op. 1976); S.C. CODEANN. § 20-3-130 (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1995); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-40 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
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intent to expand the common-law.26 The court drew further support from
identified common-law trends in favor of expanded rights for wives.
Specifically, the Burton court noted the extension of a loss of consortium to
wives.27 Burton, however, left unresolved the issue of what actions a creditor
must take to collect from a non-debtor spouse. 28 Evans picked up where
Burton left off. The Evans court established a precise, three-part test for the
creditor's prima facie showing. That is, in order to recover under the
necessaries doctrine, a creditor must prove:
(1) necessaries were provided to the spouse; (2) the person against whom
the action is brought was married to the person to whom the necessaries
were provided at the time the necessaries were provided; and (3) despite
demand therefor, payment for the necessaries has not been made by the
person to whom the necessaries were provided.29
Evans was a consolidation of two collection actions by Trident Regional
Medical Center against Linda P. and Henry A. Evans, and Patricia L. and
Craig Drawdy for unpaid medical services." Both defendant wives received
medical attention during the course of their marriages, were billed for their
treatment, and failed to pay the hospital. 31 Neither Mr. Evans nor Mr.
Drawdy signed a personal guaranty for the debt incurred from the services.
The trial court entered default judgments against both wives, but refused
default judgments against their husbands because the hospital had not first
brought suit against the wives individually. Trident then appealed. 32
The Evans court examined the policy behind the common-law necessaries
doctrine and the changing social patterns that had led to its gender-neutral
application.33 By looking at the necessaries doctrine as a creditor's remedy
that historically induced creditors to provide a spouse with food, clothing,
shelter, and medical treatment on the other spouse's credit but without his or
her express guaranty, the Evans court reasoned that the doctrine would remain
viable only if creditors could continue to rely on it for efficient reimbursement
34
of necessaries.

26. See Burton, 282 S.C. at 161, 318 S.E.2d at 13.
27. Id. (citing Hiott v. Contracting Services, 276 S.C. 632, 281 S.E.2d 224 (1981)).
28. Id. at 161, 318 S.E.2d at 13-14.
29. Trident Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Evans, 317 S.C. 346, 349-50, 454 S.E.2d 343, 345 (Ct. App.
1995).
30. Id. at 347, 454 S.E.2d at 344.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 347-48, 454 S.E.2d at 344.
34. Id. at 351-52 n.2, 454 S.E.2d at 346 n.2 ("[Tihe necessaries doctrine historically has been
a creditor's remedy, encouraging the extension of credit to married women .... Our approach
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Although the original goals of the necessaries doctrine have diminished
because the wife's role in the family context generally no longer fits the
traditional stereotype of a dependent homemaker and because wives are no
longer barred from owning property or contracting for goods and services,35
the necessaries doctrine still recognizes marriage as an economic partnership.
The court used the marital partnership concept with its "shared wealth, rights,
and duties" to justify its imposition of joint and several liability.36 The
general idea is that under Evans's rules of application, the necessaries doctrine
will encourage providers of necessaries to meet familial needs with the
assurance that all the financial resources of the family are available to satisfy
the debt.37
The court reasoned that forcing creditors to seek judgment against the
spouse who incurred the debt before taking action to collect against the
secondarily liable spouse would discourage creditors from providing
necessaries because of the increased burden of collection. 38 Thus, the court
adopted North Carolina's approach of joint and several liability3 9 with some
minor modifications.'
The basis of the court's conclusion is that the necessaries doctrine is a
creditor's remedy; 4 however, the announced purpose of the doctrine
historically was to provide wives a remedy of support against husbands who
failed to support them.42 By recognizing that creditors were historically the
primary beneficiaries of the necessaries doctrine because the doctrine saved

simply recognizes that any remaining goals of the doctrine can be realized only if the doctrine
is used and relied upon by creditors.").
35. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
36. Evans, 317 S.C. at 349, 454 S.E.2d at 345.
37. Id.
38. See id.
39. North Carolina Baptist Hosps., Inc. v. Harris, 354 S.E.2d 471 (N.C. 1987). The court
found local support for imposing joint and several liability inAteyeh v. Volkswagen of Florence,
Inc., 288 S.C. 101, 341 S.E.2d 378 (1986), in which the supreme court held that a wife had
standing to sue her husband's insurance company for bad faith failure to pay her husband's
medical bills because the wife was directly liable for non-payment. Id. at 103,341 S.E.2d at 379.
The Ateyeh court pronounced that the wife was "individually liable for medical expenses," id.,
provided to her spouse; otherwise, the wife's interest in the suit would have been contingent on
first finding the husband liable for the debt. Evans, 317 S.C. at 350, 454 S.E.2d at 345
(construing Ateyeh, 288 S.C. at 103, 341 S.E.2d at 380). The court reasoned that "[b]y virtue
of the necessaries doctrine, Mrs. Ateyeh stands in a derivative policyholder position, and her
interest in enforcement of the policy is not merely contingent." Ateyeh, 288 S.C. at 103, 341
S.E.2d at 380. If her interest were contingent, she would not have had standing to sue the
insurance company.
40. Evans, 317 S.C. at 349, 454 S.E.2d at 345.
41. See Evans, 317 S.C. at 351-52 n.2, 454 S.E.2d at 346 n.2.
42. See CLARK, supra note 10, at 251.
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creditors the cost of obtaining a husband's express guaranty, the court shifted
its focus from the duty of spousal support to a pro-creditor approach.
The main criticism of the Evans joint-and-several-liability approach is that
it fails to protect the non-debtor spouse's property when the debtor spouse is
solvent yet unwilling to pay.43 However, this criticism is unjustified when the
non-debtor spouse is able to seek contribution or reimbursement from the
debtor spouse. Thus, the modem necessaries doctrine shifts the burden of
pursuing the debtor spouse to the non-debtor spouse without foreclosing the
latter's remedies. Concerns also exist that the protections afforded by tenancy
by the entirety of joint property, such as the marital home, will be nullified
because joint and several liability reaches not only each spouse's personal
assets but joint ones as well.' Because South Carolina abolished tenancy by
the entirety in 1953, 41 loss of protections afforded to the tenancy by the
entirety estate are no longer at issue.
Other criticism has focused on the negative effect of the original goal
underlying the necessaries doctrine-providing support to a needy wife.
Although a wife in need can still receive necessaries on her husband's credit
under the modernized doctrine, one commentator has argued that "[c]reditors
will give little weight to a needy wife's support right, yet will be wary of her
potential liability for her husband's purchases, and thus will be more reluctant
than ever to give her credit." 46 However, such a statement overlooks the fact
that, by providing creditors with an alternate source of repayment in the
broadened necessaries doctrine, the cost of credit is lowered to married women
who have no credit of their own.
In conclusion, it appears that through its decision in Evans the South
Carolina Court of Appeals has adopted a form of the necessaries doctrine that
protects the creditor even though the same court had seemingly chosen an
approach that protected the non-debtor spouse in Hagen. Creditors, particularly hospitals, should find the amended doctrine useful to satisfy outstanding
debts for necessaries incurred during the course of the marriage. The new
features that broaden the modern incarnation of the necessaries doctrine
include liability upon the wife as well as upon the husband, abandonment of

43. See Marcus L. Moxley, Note, North Carolina Baptist Hospitals, Inc. v. Harris: North
CarolinaAdopts a Gender-NeutralApproach to the Doctrine of Necessaries, 66 N.C. L. REV.
1241, 1246-48 (1988).
44. Id. at 1251-52. The Virginia legislature has recognized the need to protect the marital
home and balance creditors' and debtors' rights and has enacted a statute that protects the marital
home from the joint and several reach of the necessaries doctrine. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-37
(Michie 1995) (protecting the debtor's principal residence from the reach of creditors).
45. See Davis v. Davis, 223 S.C. 182, 75 S.E.2d 46 (1953). The state's rejection of the legal
fiction that husband and wife are a single legal entity was a precursor to tenancy by the entirety's
demise. See id.
46. Note, The Unnecessary Doctrine of Necessaries,82 MICH. L. REV. 1767, 1783 (1984).
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the common-law restriction that the creditor had to rely on the non-debtor
spouse's credit in providing the necessaries, and diminished recognition of the
spouse's ability to pay for the goods and services in defining what is
necessary. As is evident in Evans and Harris, the non-debtor spouse does not
have to personally guaranty the debts of the debtor spouse or take any other
action that would cause the creditor to rely on the non-debtor spouse for
payment. As medical expenses can rapidly run into hundreds of thousands of
dollars, the family's standard of living and ability to pay is no longer
recognized as a restriction upon what is deemed a necessary. Loss of these
common-law checks and balances upon the necessaries doctrine has eased the
burden for creditors in collecting debts. However, disappearance of these
checks may also lead to extravagant spending by spouses in certain cases and
to increased hardship when a family disaster strikes, such as loss of the marital
home to satisfy bills for cancer treatment of the family breadwinner.4 7
Practitioners arguing against joint and several liability may consider the
argument that the Evans court mistakenly viewed the policy of the necessaries
doctrine as a creditors' remedy rather than as a means of support for destitute
wives. Furthermore, joint and several liability fails to consider whether the
primarily liable spouse needs the financial assistance of the non-debtor spouse.
Finally, while applying the necessaries doctrine in a gender-neutral fashion
comports with the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution, joint and
several liability may not take into account continuing disparities between the
genders in levels of income and job opportunities.
Practitioners advocating creditors' rights should argue that, unless
creditors can rely on the doctrine to expediently reimburse them, they will be
reluctant to extend credit without a personal guaranty from the other spouse.
Thus, the goal of providing support to a needy spouse will be defeated.
Furthermore, if courts were to restrict creditors from collection against the
non-debtor spouse until they obtained a judgment against the debtor spouse,
creditors may be foreclosed from repayment when they are unsuccessful at
personally serving the debtor spouse.4" Practitioners may also want to pursue
contractual and unjust enrichment remedies as alternatives to the collection
remedy provided by the necessaries doctrine49 and should still advise their
creditor clients to get an express guaranty from the non-debtor spouse even
though the necessaries doctrine does not require one.
Ian W. Freeman

47. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-41-30(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995) (South Carolina's homestead exemption only exempts $10,000 of the residence's value from the bankruptcy estate in the
case of property jointly titled in the name of the husband and wife and $5,000 if titled
individually).
48. See Bethany Med. Ctr. v. Niyazi, 890 P.2d 349, 352 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995).
49. Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Modern Status of Rule that Husband is Primarily or Solely
Liable for Necessaries FurnishedWife, 20 A.L.R.4TH 196, 199 (1983).
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Il. ARE SECURED CREDITORS LIABLE FOR
TORTS OF A REPOSSESSION SERVICE?

Section 36-9-5031 of the South Carolina Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC) permits secured creditors to take possession of collateral without
judicial process if such repossession does not involve a breach of the peace.2
Using this authorization to avoid the expense of court proceedings, some
secured creditors contract with repossession services to take possession of
collateral. If a repossession service breaches the peace during the repossession
and injures a third party, then the question arises as to whether the contracting
secured creditor is liable for the injuries.
This article discusses how a South Carolina court might rule on this issue.
The inquiry is divided into two parts: (1) Is the repossession service a servant
of the secured creditor? and (2) If the repossession service is not a servant, but
an independent contractor, can the secured creditor still be held liable? South
Carolina courts likely would find that a repossession service is not a servant,
but an independent contractor; however, they likely would find that the
secured creditor nonetheless is liable because the duty imposed in section
9-503 of the UCC is nondelegable.
South Carolina courts adhere to the doctrine of respondeat superior.
Generally, a person is liable only for his or her own acts or omissions. The
doctrine of respondeat superior, however, imposes liability on the master for
torts committed by the servant and within the servant's scope of employment. 3
Therefore, a determination that a repossession service is the servant4 of a

1. "Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default the right to take possession of the
collateral. In taking possession a secured party may proceed without judicial process if this can
be done without breach of the peace .... ." S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-503 (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1995).
2. The South Carolina Supreme Court has defined "breach of the peace":
In general terms, a breach of the peace is a violation of public order, a disturbance
of pubic tranquillity, by any act or conduct inciting to violence ....
It is not
necessary that the peace be actually broken to lay the foundation of a prosecution for
this offense. If what is done is unjustifiable, tending with sufficient directness to break
the peace, no more is required.
Lyda v. Cooper, 169 S.C. 451, 455, 169 S.E. 236, 238 (1933) (citations omitted). No element
of violence is required to constitute a breach of the peace. Thompson v. Ford Motor Credit Co.,
324 F. Supp. 108, 115 (D.S.C. 1971).
3. South Carolina Ins. Co. v. James C. Greene & Co., 290 S.C. 171, 179, 348 S.E.2d 617,
621 (Ct. App. 1986).
4. Some courts prefer the term "employee" to "servant." The meanings of these terms are
the same and the consequences that flow from either label are the same. Simmons v. Robinson,
303 S.C. 201,205,399 S.E.2d 605,607 (Ct. App. 1990), rev'don other grounds, 305 S.C. 428,
409 S.E.2d 381 (1991).
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secured creditor would render the secured creditor liable for all torts
committed by the repossession service during repossession of collateral.
As yet, no South Carolina court has decided whether a repossession
service is a servant or an independent contractor of the secured creditor.
Coming close to the issue in Jordan v. Citizens & Southern National Bank,'
the South Carolina Supreme Court characterized a repossession service as the
agent of a secured creditor. Normally this characterization would have no
effect on the issue of respondeat superior because liability under that doctrine
can be imposed upon a party only for the torts of its servant. An agent can
be either a servant or an independent contractor. 7 A principal is not liable for
the torts of an independent contractor. Some South Carolina courts, however,
have used the terms agent and servant interchangeably. 9 Because the court in
Jordan found that no breach of the peace occurred,' 0 the court did not discuss
whether liability for a breach would have been imputed.
In ascertaining when a master-servant relationship exists, the South
Carolina Supreme Court stated: "The determination of the question in each
case depends largely upon its own factual situation, subject to certain
established general principles."" The primary principle in the analysis
concerns whether an employer has "the right to control the servant in the
performance of his work and the manner in which it is done."' 2 The actual
control exercised is not determinative, but the right and authority to control

5. 278 S.C. 449, 450, 298 S.E.2d 213, 213 (1982) ("Midland Auto Recovery Service, Inc.
acted as agent for the bank in bringing about the repossession.").
6. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2 cmt. b (1957) ("The word 'servant' is thus used
to distinguish a group of persons for whose physical conduct the master is responsible to third
persons .... For the purpose of determining whether or not the employer is responsible for their
physical conduct, however, it is immaterial whether such persons are agents or not agents.").
7. Id. § 2 (defining servant as a type of agent and stating that an independent contractor may
or may not be an agent).
8. See South Carolina Workers' Compensation Comm'n v. Ray Covington Realtors Inc.,
S.C. _,_, 459 S.E.2d 302, 303-04 (1995).
9. See Jamison v. Howard, 275 S.C. 344, 350-51, 271 S.E.2d 116, 119 (1980) (stating that
a reasonable juror could determine that tortfeasor was agent of defendant, making the defendant
liable under respondeat superior); Self v. Goodrich, 300 S.C. 349, 354, 387 S.E.2d 713, 716
(Ct. App. 1989) (stating that negligence may be imputed if Goodrich found to be the "agent or
servant of the hospital," but not if Goodrich found to be an independent contractor). But see Love
v. Gamble, 316 S.C. 203, 213, 448 S.E.2d 876, 881 (Ct. App. 1994) ("An independent
contractor can also be an agent; the two are not mutually exclusive.").
10. Jordan, 278 S.C. at 452, 298 S.E.2d at 214.
11. Young v. Warr, 252 S.C. 179, 189, 165 S.E.2d 797, 802 (1969).
12. Kilgore Group, Inc. v. South Carolina Employment Sec. Comm'n, 313 S.C. 65, 68, 437
S.E.2d 48, 49 (1993); accord Gamble v. Stevenson, 305 S.C. 104, 107, 406 S.E.2d 350, 352
(1991); Anderson v. West, 270 S.C. 184, 187, 241 S.E.2d 551, 553 (1978); Young, 252 S.C.
at 189, 165 S.E.2d at 802.
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the particular undertaking and the manner in which it is accomplished are the
crucial aspects of the test.' 3
South Carolina courts have adopted a four-factor test to determine if the
right to control exists: "(1) direct evidence of the right to, or exercise of,
control; (2) method of payment; (3) furnishing of equipment; and (4) right to
fire."' 4 Thus, the most important factor in deciding whether a repossession
service is the servant of a secured creditor is the right or authority to control
the repossession and the manner in which it is exercised.
Several cases provide helpful indications of how a South Carolina court
would decide the issue. Anderson v. West 5 stands for the proposition that the
employer need not actually exercise control over the other party in order for
the other party to become a servant.' 6 That is, even if a secured creditor
exercises no actual control over a repossession, the repossession service may
be a servant if the secured creditor could have exercised control.
The control exercised must be more pervasive than instructions to carry
out a specific objective. In Young Southeastern Reconditioning Center hired
Richard Young to drive cars from various destinations to Darlington, South
Carolina. 7 Southeastern provided each driver with a specific route to take
and a few minor regulations prohibiting driving in excess of the speed limit
and driving while under the influence of alcohol.'" Despite these instructions,
the court held that no master-servant relationship existed between Young and
Southeastern, stating:
The mere fact that one of the contracting parties is empowered to give
general directions as to what is to be done without control of the method
or means of doing it does not necessarily have the effect of creating the
relation of principal and agent or master and servant because such relates
only to the result to be attained.1 9
In Simmons v. Robinson0 the employer was concerned with the specific
manner in which the obligation of agency was carried out. Specifically, Simmons addressed the issue of whether a foster parent was a servant of the South
Carolina Department of Social Services (DSS). Because of the numerous and

13. Anderson, 270 S.C. at 187, 241 S.E.2d at 553.
14. Kilgore, 313 S.C. at 68, 437 S.E.2d at 49-50; accord South Carolina Workers'
Compensation Comm'n v. Ray Covington Realtors Inc., _S.C. _,
_,459 S.E.2d 302,303
(1995); Chavis v. Watkins, 256 S.C. 30, 32, 180 S.E.2d 648, 649 (1971).
15. 270 S.C. 184, 241 S.E.2d 551 (1978).
16. Id. at 187, 241 S.E.2d at 553.
17. Young, 252 S.C. at 190-91, 165 S.E.2d at 803.
18. Id. at 194, 165 S.E.2d at 804.
19. Id. at 196, 165 S.E.2d at 805.
20. 303 S.C. 201, 205-07, 399 S.E.2d 605, 608-09 (Ct. App. 1990).
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detailed guidelines imposed on foster parents, the court concluded that DSS
exercised significant control over the performance of the work and the manner
in which it was done.2 "By no means does DSS say to foster parents, 'Here
is a child. Give us an adult.' Rather, it is clear that the agency reserves an
interest in how the work of the foster parents is performed, not merely an
interest in the finished product."'
When the principles from these cases are applied to the relationship
between a secured creditor and a repossession service, it appears that a party
injured by a repossession service during a repossession would encounter
difficulty in proving that a secured creditor exercised sufficient control over
the details of the repossession. In addition, analysis of the other factors in the
four-part test suggests that only in rare circumstances will a repossession
service be the servant of a secured creditor. If an employer pays a regular
salary to another party, the inference that the party is a servant grows
stronger.21 However, a secured creditor would be expected to compensate a
repossession service only upon completion of a repossession. Because of the
inability to predict when or how often repossessions will take place, a secured
creditor would not likely pay a regular salary to a repossession service. A
master-servant relationship is also more likely when the employer furnishes
equipment; 4 however, almost no situation can be envisioned in which a
secured creditor would supply a repossession service the tools for a repossession. Finally, the right to fire is an indication of a master's control.' Secured
creditors probably retain the right to terminate the relationship with a repossession service. This is the only factor in the four-part test that indicates a master
servant relationship.

21. On appeal, the supreme court held that DSS was not liable under respondeat superior for
the tort of the foster parent because the foster parent was a licensee of DSS, not a servant or
independent contractor. Simmons v. Robinson, 305 S.C. 428,431,409 S.E.2d 381, 383 (1991).
The court stated that the existence of a right of control was irrelevant and added: "The legal
status of the foster mother, as a licensee, makes it unnecessary to apply Chavis and the test for
right of control." Id. at 431, 409 S.E.2d at 383.
22. Simnwns, 303 S.C. at 208, 399 S.E.2d at 609. For other examples of courts examining
control and right to control, see South Carolina Workers' Compensation Comm'n v. Ray
Covington Realtors, _ S.C. _, _, 459 S.E.2d 302, 303 (1995), which determined that a
real estate salesman was an independent contractor because he set his own hours, chose his own
clients, and received no payment unless he made a sale, and Gamble v. Stevenson, 305 S.C. 104,
108, 406 S.E.2d 350, 352 (1991), which characterized a subcontractor of Southern Bell as a
servant because Southern Bell's cable repairman personally instructed him where to dig the pit,
how to remove the sign, and how to replace the sign.
23. See Kilgore Group, Inc. v. South Carolina Employment See. Comm'n, 313 S.C. 65, 69,
437 S.E.2d 48, 50 (1993).
24. See id.
25. See id.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol48/iss1/8

12

Freeman and Haynie: Creditors' Rights

1996]

CREDITOR'S RIGHTS

Some courts also look to the contract of employment when deciding if a
master-servant relationship exists. In Young the court stated that the contract
of employment should be given "considerable weight" in such a determination.' The inquiry should focus on the "intention of the parties which is to
be gathered from the whole scope of the language used."27 Nevertheless,
language in a contract designating the relationship as one of employer and
independent contractor is not dispositive.28 The court relied on the contract
in Young because the contract stated that the employee was an independent
contractor.29 Also, the court found that the employee realized the impact of
his status as an independent contractor.30
Because classifying a party as a servant or an independent contractor
hinges upon the facts of each case, no firm rule can apply every time a
secured creditor hires a repossession service. Despite questions raised by the
supreme court's characterization of Midland Auto Recovery Service as an
agent of Citizens and Southern Bank in Jordan3 ' and the contractual basis of
Young,32 a South Carolina court faced with the issue would likely hold as
other jurisdictions have. For instance, in Nichols v. Metropolitan Banl 3 the
Minnesota Court of Appeals held that the repossession service, R.J. Control
Service, was an independent contractor. R.J. Control repossessed a car using
its own method and at the time and place of its choice; the bank paid R.J.
Control only after the completed repossession; R.J. Control provided its own
materials and tools; and the bank could not fire R.J. Control as if it were a
bank employee.34 Faced with a factual scenario similar to Nichols, a South
Carolina court should also rule that a repossession service employed by a
secured creditor is an independent contractor.
If a South Carolina court determines that a repossession service is an
independent contractor, the question remains as to whether a secured creditor
is liable for torts committed by the independent contractor. South Carolina
adheres to the general rule that an employer is not liable for tortious acts
committed by an independent contractor.35 Therefore, courts must determine
if an exception exists by which the secured creditor could be held liable.
Other jurisdictions that treat repossession services as independent contractors have imposed liability on a secured creditor for the torts committed by a

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Young, 252 S.C. at 194, 165 S.E.2d at 805.
Id.
Kilgore, 313 S.C. at 68-69, 437 S.E.2d at 50.
Young, 252 S.C. at 194, 165 S.E.2d at 805.
Id.
278 S.C. at 450, 298 S.E.2d at 213.
252 S.C. at 194, 165 S.E.2d at 805.
435 N.W.2d 637, 640 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
Id. at 639-40.
Duane v. Presley Constr. Co., 270 S.C. 682, 683, 244 S.E.2d 509, 510 (1978).
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repossession service.3 6 These courts have reasoned that the duty not to breach
the peace is nondelegable and have relied on the Restatement (Second) of Torts
(Restatement) section 424, which provides:
One who by statute or by administrative regulation is under a duty to
provide specified safeguards or precautions for the safety of others is
subject to liability to the others for whose protection the duty is imposed
for harm caused by the failure of a contractor employed by him to provide
such safeguards or precautions.37
The Texas Supreme Court is one of two state supreme courts to address
the issue of a secured creditor's liability for the torts of a repossession service.
In MBank El Paso v. Sanchez 8 when Yvonne Sanchez defaulted on a note
secured by her car, the secured creditor, MBank El Paso, hired El Paso
Recovery Service to repossess the car. During the repossession, Sanchez got
into the car and locked the doors. El Paso Recovery continued the repossession, towed the car to a repossession yard, and left Sanchez in the lot. Sanchez
filed suit against MBank, alleging that MBank was liable for the torts of El
Paso Recovery. MBank maintained that it was not liable because it delegated
39
its duty not to breach the peace to an independent contractor.
The court rejected MBank's argument, citing the Restatement for the
proposition that parties under a statutory duty to provide certain safeguards can
not delegate such a duty to independent contractors.4" The court found that
section 9.503 of the Texas Business and Commercial Code imposed a duty on
MBank to take precautions for public safety during a nonjudicial repossession.4 Therefore, if a breach of the peace occurred during the repossession
of collateral for MBank, MBank was liable whether it committed the breach
or an independent contractor committed the breach.42

36. General Fin. Corp. v. Smith, 505 So. 2d 1045 (Ala. 1987); Sammons v. Broward Bank,
599 So. 2d 1018 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992); Fulton v. Anchor Say. Bank, 452 S.E.2d 208 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1994); Nichols, 435 N.W.2d at 640-41; Mauro v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.,
626 N.Y.S.2d 374 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995); McCall v. Owens, 820 S.W.2d 748 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1991); MBank El Paso v. Sanchez, 836 S.W.2d 151 (Tex. 1992).
37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 424 (1965).

38. 836 S.W.2d 151, 152 (Tex. 1992).
39. Id.

40. Id. at 153.
41. Id. at 152. Texas adopted section 9-503 at the UCC verbatim.
42. Id. at 153. Other courts that have imposed liability on a secured creditor for the torts of
an independent contractor during repossession have adopted identical reasoning. See, e.g.,
General Fin. Corp. v. Smith, 505 So. 2d 1045, 1047-48 (Ala. 1987); Sammons v. Broward
Bank, 599 So. 2d 1018, 1020 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992); Fulton v. Anchor Say. Bank, 452
S.E.2d 208, 214 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994); Nichols v. Metropolitan Bank, 435 N.W.2d 637, 640
(Minn. Ct. App. 1989); Mauro v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 626 N.Y.S.2d 374,376-77
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The Texas Supreme Court recognized that a secured creditor has a strong
interest in seizing the collateral securing a defaulted loan.43 However, the
court balanced the interest of the secured creditor against society's interest in
the public peace, stating: "If a creditor chooses to pursue self-help, it must be
expected to take precautions in doing so. If this burden is too heavy, the
creditor may seek relief by turning to the courts."' When MBank chose to
repossess the collateral without the assistance of the judicial system, "it assumed the risk that a breach of the peace might occur."4s
The Alabama Supreme Court also addressed the issue of a secured
creditor's liability for the torts of a repossession service.46 The court in
General Finance Corp. v. Smith faced a situation almost identical to that in
Sanchez. When a debtor defaulted on a loan the defendant hired a repossession
service to retrieve the collateral. During the repossession the service breached
the peace. The plaintiff sued, and the defendant bank claimed that it escaped
liability because the repossession service was an independent contractor.47
The court ruled that the duty imposed by section 9-503 of the Alabama
Commercial Code was nondelegable, citing section 424 of the Restatement.4"
Like the court in Sanchez, most courts finding that the duty to avoid a
breach of the peace in a self-help repossession is nondelegable base their
rulings on public policy. The Alabama Supreme Court in General Finance
Corp. explained: "It is axiomatic that this duty is based on sound public
policy." 49 In Nichols the Minnesota Court of Appeals pointed to the harsh
nature of the remedy selected by the secured creditor and asserted that strict
application of UCC section 9-503 was necessary to "prevent abuse and
discourage illegal conduct. " " In support of a similar ruling the Georgia
Court of Appeals, in Fulton v. Anchor Savings Bank, stated: "We will not
diminish this sound public policy by relieving a repossessing creditor of
liability simply because the creditor employs an independent contractor to
carry out the task of repossession.""
No court has ruled that a secured creditor can delegate to an independent
contractor its duty to avoid a breach of the peace under UCC section 9-503.

(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995); McCall v. Owens, 820 S.W.2d 748, 751-52 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991).
43. Sanchez, 836 S.W.2d at 154.
44. Id. at 154.
45. Id.
46. General Fin. Corp., 505 So. 2d at 1047-48.
47. Id. at 1047.
48. Id. at 1047-48.
49. Id. at 1048.
50. 435 N.W.2d at 641; see also Mauro v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 626 N.Y.S.2d
374, 377 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995).
51. Fulton, 452 S.E.2d at 214.
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Therefore, arguments for delegating this duty are scarce; however, two
52
lengthy dissents in Sanchez outline several theories against nondelegability.
In the first Sanchez dissent, Justice Cook maintained that the court created
strict liability in an area in which it was inappropriate. 3 Although admitting
that the facts in Sanchez may have justified imposition of liability on the
secured creditor, Cook believed that the majority's ruling would unfairly
disadvantage secured creditors who hire independent contractors to carry out
repossessions. Justice Cook stated:
If the plaintiff in this case goes back to trial and proves that the
repossessor committed a breach of the peace, then the bank which hired
the contractor is liable. Liability is absolute and extreme. The bank has no
defenses, outside of proving that no breach of the peace occurred. Even if
the bank had no knowledge of the contractor's actions, the bank cannot
defend. Even if the bank expressly ordered the contractor to proceed
cautiously, the bank cannot protest. Even if the bank did not knowingly or
recklessly violate the statute, the bank will be exposed to punitive damag54
es.
Responding to the policy arguments proffered by the majority, Justice
Hecht outlined a separate argument against extending liability to the secured
creditor. Hecht contended that secured creditors would change many of their
repossession policies. 5 Initially, secured creditors would use employees more
often for repossessions. 56 When this would not be possible, secured creditors
would be motivated to seek the more expensive but less risky option of judicial
repossession over the less expensive but substantially more risky self-help
repossession.5 7 Even so, according to Justice Hecht, situations would arise
when innocent creditors would incur liability in connection with actions of
parties over which the creditors had no control. 58 These added expenses
would lead to a substantial increase in the cost of credit.5 9 Justice Hecht
stated, "I doubt whether these costs-more cases for the courts, more litigation
expense for creditors, and a dramatic increase in liability that is virtually
unavoidable in at least some circumstances-are worth the change in policy the
Court makes today."'

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Sanchez, 836 S.W.2d at 155-60 (Cook, J., and Hecht, J., dissenting).
Id. at 155 (Cook, J., dissenting).
Id. at 155.
Id. at 159 (Hecht, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Both dissenters believed that the court erred in deciding that the duty
imposed by UCC section 9-503 was nondelegable. They based their arguments
on the wording of the Restatement, which allows that an employer cannot
delegate a statutorily imposed duty "to provide specified safeguards or
precautions for the safety of others."" Many courts have interpreted the
specified duty to be a duty not to breach the peace. The majority in Sanchez
recognized UCC section 9-503 as imposing "a duty on secured creditors
pursuing nonjudicial repossession to take precautions for public safety." 62 In
Nichols the court said, "The duty to repossess property in a peaceable manner
is specifically imposed on a 'secured party' by the uniform commercial code
and is intended to protect debtors and other persons affected by repossession
activities. "63

The dissenters in Sanchez argued that the duty not to breach the peace is
not a "specified" duty. In response to the assertion that the specified duty in
UCC section 9-503 is the duty not to breach the peace, Justice Hecht stated,
"This is at best an odd fit. Not to breach the peace may be a general
guideline, but it is hardly a specified precaution."' Justice Cook voiced the
same opinion and added that Texas has applied the principle of nondelegability
to only one other group of statutes-those governing common carriers.6
Common carrier statutes exist for the purpose of insuring safer highways, and
the statutes require the carrier to obtain a permit granted by a particular state
agency before carrying commodities.' Also, the statutes limit the people and
entities that can operate a vehicle for hire. Finally, the common carrier statutes
hold that anyone operating a vehicle under such a permit is an agent of and
under the control of the permit holder.67 Justice Cook pointed out that UCC
section 9-503 does not limit the number of those allowed to operate repossession services, does not require special permits to operate a repossession
service, and does not state that a repossession service becomes an agent of the
secured creditor. 8 Justice Cook thereby maintained that UCC section 9-503
was not specific enough to mandate imposition of the nondelegability principle
of Restatement section 424.69
No state court ruling on the issue of secured creditor's liability for the
torts of a repossession service has accepted the arguments of the dissents in
Sanchez. All courts finding a repossession service to be an independent

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

§ 424 (1965) (emphasis added).
Sanchez, 836 S.W.2d at 153.
Nichols, 435 N.W.2d at 640.
Sanchez, 836 S.W.2d at 158 (dissenting opinion).
Id. at 156-57.
Id. at 157.
Id.
Id.
Id.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
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contractor have imposed liability on the employer of the repossession service
for breaches of the peace. The issue, however, has not been addressed in
South Carolina. In determining whether a South Carolina court would find the
duty to avoid a breach of the peace nondelegable, analysis of South Carolina's
approach to nondelegable duties is necessary.
The most recent South Carolina case to discuss nondelegable duty is
Simmons v. Robinson.7" The court asserted that some responsibilities are so
important to society that they cannot be delegated: "A person who delegates
to an independent contractor an absolute duty owed to another person or to the
public remains liable for the negligence of the independent contract or just as
if the independent contractor were an employee. "7 ' The court did not rely on
section 424 of the Restatement, as did the courts from other states, in holding
that the duty imposed by UCC section 9-503 is nondelegable.
In other circumstances the South Carolina Supreme Court also has ruled
that certain duties cannot be delegated to an independent contractor. In Wesley
v. Holly Hill Lumber Co. ,72 the court found that an employer could not delegate the duty to provide employees with a safe work place. The court in Dolan
v. City of Camden73 found that a municipality had a "fundamental responsibility" to provide safe streets and that even though the maintenance of the
streets was undertaken by independent contractors, the municipality remained
liable. Furthermore, South Carolina courts have found on several occasions
nondelegable duties in land ownership.74
The decisions regarding such duties illustrate a willingness by South
Carolina courts to find a duty nondelegable if a breach of the duty would bring
harm to the public. Thus, in the UCC 9-503 context, a South Carolina court
would likely be influenced by the strong public policy arguments articulated
in other jurisdictions. In addition, a South Carolina court would not face the
problem concerning whether the duty was specifically imposed by statute
because South Carolina courts have found nondelegable duties without
statutory support. In the face of the precedent established in all of the
jurisdictions that have addressed the issue, a South Carolina court should rule

70. 303 S.C. 201, 399 S.E.2d 605 (Ct. App. 1990), rev'don other grounds, 305 S.C. 428,
409 S.E.2d 381 (1991). Before reviewing the court of appeals' nondelegable duty analysis, the
supreme court reversed, holding that the DSS could not be liable because the foster parent was
a licensee. Despite this reversal the propositions stated by the court regarding nondelegable
duties remain valid.
71. Id. at 212, 399 S.E.2d at 612.
72. 211 S.C. 40, 46-50, 43 S.E.2d 619, 621-23 (1947).
73. 233 S.C. 1, 4-5, 103 S.E.2d 328, 330-31 (1958).
74. See, e.g., Duane v. Presley Constr. Co., 270 S.C. 682, 244 S.E.2d 509 (1978) (finding
landowner breached duty to neighbor when clearing of land by independent contractor resulted
in silting of adjacent pond).
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71

that a secured creditor cannot delegate the duty to avoid a breach of the peace
during a nonjudicial repossession.
A South Carolina court would probably find a secured creditor liable for
the torts committed by a repossession service during a repossession. Although
the issue must be determined by the facts of each case, under normal circumstances a secured creditor will not have sufficient right of control over the
manner in which the repossession is conducted to constitute a master-servant
relationship. Thus, the court would likely find the repossession service to be
an independent contractor. Despite this, South Carolina courts likely would
rule that the duty imposed on a secured creditor to conduct nonjudicial
repossessions without breaching the peace cannot be delegated. Therefore, the
secured creditor should be liable for such breaches committed by a repossession service.
M. Todd Haynie, III
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